From 24160db684ce9fbdd87f77bb25961e040b81240f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhengwr Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:41:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] =?UTF-8?q?security(P0=E2=91=A0):=20=E5=AE=89=E5=85=A8?= =?UTF-8?q?=E9=93=BE=E6=94=B9=20fail-safe=20=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=20+=20prod?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=E9=85=8D=E7=BD=AE=20+=20JWT=20=E5=BC=B1=E5=AF=86=E9=92=A5?= =?UTF-8?q?=E5=AE=88=E5=8D=AB?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 宽松 permitAll 链由 @Profile("!prod") 改为显式 opt-in @Profile(dev|local|ci|parity);严格认证链覆盖默认(含裸 java -jar)与 prod。新增 SecurityProfiles 作旁路名单唯一真相、JwtSecretSafetyCheck(严格 profile 下拒开发默认密钥启动)、application-prod.yml(密钥/DB 无默认强制环境变量)。修 2026-06-24 架构评审 P0:未设 profile 即全放行的 fail-open 默认。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- .../src/main/resources/application-prod.yml | 54 +++++++++++++++++ .../auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheck.java | 36 +++++++++++ .../auth/security/SecurityConfig.java | 27 +++++---- .../auth/security/SecurityProfiles.java | 58 ++++++++++++++++++ .../security/JwtSecretSafetyCheckTest.java | 59 +++++++++++++++++++ .../auth/security/SecurityProfileTest.java | 32 +++++++--- 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 platform-app/src/main/resources/application-prod.yml create mode 100644 platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheck.java create mode 100644 platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfiles.java create mode 100644 platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheckTest.java diff --git a/platform-app/src/main/resources/application-prod.yml b/platform-app/src/main/resources/application-prod.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82e05e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-app/src/main/resources/application-prod.yml @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# ============================================================================ +# 生产 profile(P0 修复,2026-06-24 架构评审:补齐缺失的 prod 配置)。 +# +# 启用方式:-Dspring.profiles.active=prod(或 SPRING_PROFILES_ACTIVE=prod)。 +# 设计原则 fail-safe:所有敏感项无内置默认,必须经环境变量显式提供, +# 缺失即启动失败——杜绝继承 application.yml 的开发默认值(共享测试库 / 弱 JWT 密钥)裸奔进生产。 +# +# 安全链:prod 不在 SecurityProfiles 旁路名单内 → 自动走严格链(其余 /api/** 强制认证), +# 且 JwtSecretSafetyCheck 在此 profile 下拒绝开发默认 JWT 密钥。 +# ============================================================================ + +spring: + datasource: + # 生产库连接必须经环境变量提供,无默认值(缺失 → 占位符解析失败 → 启动拒绝)。 + url: ${EIP4_DB_URL} + username: ${EIP4_DB_USERNAME} + password: ${EIP4_DB_PASSWORD} + hikari: + maximum-pool-size: ${EIP4_DB_POOL_MAX:20} + read-only: false + connection-init-sql: "SET statement_timeout = '${EIP4_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT:120s}'" + +server: + port: ${SERVER_PORT:8084} + +eip4: + auth: + jwt: + # 生产 JWT 密钥必须经环境变量提供,无默认值(故意去掉 application.yml 的 dev 默认回退)。 + # 缺失 → 占位符解析失败启动拒绝;若误填为开发默认值 → JwtSecretSafetyCheck 拒绝启动。 + secret: ${EIP4_AUTH_JWT_SECRET} + expire-seconds: ${EIP4_AUTH_JWT_EXPIRE_SECONDS:28800} + issuer: eip4-platform + file: + # 生产附件根必须为绝对路径,经环境变量提供。 + root: ${EIP4_FILE_ROOT} + +# 可观测性:生产仅暴露健康探针,详情仅对已认证者可见(匿名只见 UP/DOWN)。 +management: + endpoints: + web: + exposure: + include: health + endpoint: + health: + probes: + enabled: true + show-details: when-authorized + show-components: when-authorized + +logging: + level: + com.dsasp: INFO + org.springframework.jdbc.core: INFO diff --git a/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheck.java b/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheck.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efc09b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheck.java @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +package com.eip4.platform.auth.security; + +import org.springframework.core.env.Environment; +import org.springframework.stereotype.Component; + +/** + * JWT 弱密钥启动守卫(P0,2026-06-24 架构评审)。 + * + *

{@code application.yml} 给出「非生产默认密钥」 + * ({@value #DEV_DEFAULT_SECRET})供 dev/local/ci 开箱即用。风险:若生产(或任何 + * 非旁路 profile)忘记经 {@code EIP4_AUTH_JWT_SECRET} 覆盖,该默认密钥会静默签发可伪造令牌。 + * + *

本守卫在启动期判定:激活的是严格 profile + * ({@link SecurityProfiles#isBypassActive(Environment)} 为 false,含 prod 与未设 profile) + * 却仍使用开发默认密钥 → 启动即失败,杜绝弱密钥裸奔进生产。 + * + *

旁路 profile(dev/local/ci/parity)下跳过本检查,保留默认密钥开箱即用。 + * {@link JwtService} 仍独立校验密钥存在且 ≥256bit;本守卫只补「默认值不得进严格环境」一条。 + */ +@Component +public class JwtSecretSafetyCheck { + + /** application.yml 内置的非生产默认密钥;严格 profile 下出现即拒启动。 */ + static final String DEV_DEFAULT_SECRET = + "dev-only-eip4-jwt-secret-change-me-in-production-0123456789"; + + public JwtSecretSafetyCheck(JwtProperties props, Environment env) { + if (!SecurityProfiles.isBypassActive(env) + && DEV_DEFAULT_SECRET.equals(props.getSecret())) { + throw new IllegalStateException( + "严格安全 profile(prod 或未设旁路 profile)下仍使用 application.yml 的开发默认 JWT 密钥;" + + "生产部署必须经环境变量 EIP4_AUTH_JWT_SECRET 设置强随机密钥(≥32 字节)," + + "或仅在 dev/local/ci/parity profile 下使用默认密钥。"); + } + } +} diff --git a/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityConfig.java b/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityConfig.java index 41e2bb5..756aae9 100644 --- a/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityConfig.java +++ b/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityConfig.java @@ -15,15 +15,20 @@ import org.springframework.security.web.util.matcher.AntPathRequestMatcher; /** * Spring Security 配置(无状态,STATELESS:不建 HttpSession,免 session 共享)。 * - *

双链按 profile 装配: + *

双链按 profile 装配(fail-safe 默认): *

- * 「生产绝不放行」由 {@code @Profile} 条件装配硬保证,并由 {@code SecurityProfileTest} 断言。 + * P0 修复(2026-06-24 架构评审):旧实现宽松链为 {@code @Profile("!prod")},未设 profile 即 fail-open + * 全放行。现改为旁路显式 opt-in,默认 fail-safe(忘设 profile = 强制认证)。 + * 旁路 profile 名单集中在 {@link SecurityProfiles},「生产/默认绝不放行」由 {@code @Profile} 条件装配 + * 硬保证,并由 {@code SecurityProfileTest} 断言。 * *

两链共享的放行清单与无状态/无表单/无 CSRF 设定抽到 {@link #applyCommon}。 */ @@ -46,9 +51,9 @@ public class SecurityConfig { this.roleResolver = roleResolver; } - /** 生产链:其余 /api/** 一律需认证,无测试旁路。 */ + /** 严格链(默认 + prod):旁路 profile 全不激活时装配,其余 /api/** 一律需认证,无测试旁路。 */ @Bean - @Profile("prod") + @Profile(SecurityProfiles.STRICT) SecurityFilterChain prodFilterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception { applyCommon(http); http.authorizeHttpRequests(reg -> reg @@ -62,11 +67,11 @@ public class SecurityConfig { } /** - * 非生产链(default/local/ci):保留 permitAll 测试通道。 + * 宽松链(显式 opt-in:dev/local/ci/parity):保留 permitAll 测试通道。 * JWT 过滤器照常挂载——带令牌走 JWT 上下文,不带令牌走 asUser/roles 旁路(对拍 CI 依赖)。 */ @Bean - @Profile("!prod") + @Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS) SecurityFilterChain devFilterChain(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception { applyCommon(http); http.authorizeHttpRequests(reg -> reg.anyRequest().permitAll()); diff --git a/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfiles.java b/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfiles.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cd6661 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-auth/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfiles.java @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +package com.eip4.platform.auth.security; + +import java.util.Set; + +import org.springframework.core.env.Environment; + +/** + * 安全旁路 profile 的唯一真相。 + * + *

历史问题(P0,2026-06-24 架构评审):宽松安全链曾用 {@code @Profile("!prod")},即 + * 未显式设 prod 的一切场景(含「裸 {@code java -jar} 未设任何 profile」)都开 + * {@code permitAll} + {@code asUser/roles} 旁路 → fail-open 默认。忘记设 profile = 全放行。 + * + *

修复:把旁路改为显式 opt-in。仅 {@link #BYPASS_NAMES} 里的 profile + * (开发/对拍/CI)开启免令牌旁路;其余一切(prod、以及未设任何 profile)走严格链。 + * 即默认 fail-safe——忘记设 profile = 强制认证,而非全放行。 + * + *

+ * + *

{@link SecurityConfig} 的 {@code @Profile} 表达式与本类的名单必须一致, + * 故 {@link #BYPASS} / {@link #STRICT} 提供编译期常量给注解复用, + * {@link #isBypassActive(Environment)} 给运行期判定(JWT 弱密钥守卫等)复用。 + */ +public final class SecurityProfiles { + + private SecurityProfiles() { + } + + /** 开启免令牌旁路的 profile 名(运行期判定用)。 */ + static final Set BYPASS_NAMES = Set.of("dev", "local", "ci", "parity"); + + /** 宽松(旁路)链的 {@code @Profile} 表达式——与 {@link #BYPASS_NAMES} 一致。 */ + public static final String BYPASS = "dev | local | ci | parity"; + + /** 严格链的 {@code @Profile} 表达式:旁路 profile 全不激活(含 prod 与未设 profile)。 */ + public static final String STRICT = "!dev & !local & !ci & !parity"; + + /** + * 当前是否激活了任一旁路 profile。 + * 用于运行期 fail-safe 判定(如 prod/严格场景下拒绝弱 JWT 密钥)。 + */ + public static boolean isBypassActive(Environment env) { + if (env == null) { + return false; + } + for (String p : env.getActiveProfiles()) { + if (BYPASS_NAMES.contains(p)) { + return true; + } + } + return false; + } +} diff --git a/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheckTest.java b/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheckTest.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63e651e --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/JwtSecretSafetyCheckTest.java @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +package com.eip4.platform.auth.security; + +import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatCode; +import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatThrownBy; + +import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; +import org.springframework.mock.env.MockEnvironment; + +/** + * JWT 弱密钥启动守卫断言:严格 profile 下用开发默认密钥必须拒启动;旁路 profile 或强密钥放行。 + */ +class JwtSecretSafetyCheckTest { + + private JwtProperties props(String secret) { + JwtProperties p = new JwtProperties(); + p.setSecret(secret); + p.setIssuer("eip4-platform"); + return p; + } + + @Test + void 严格profile下开发默认密钥_拒启动() { + MockEnvironment env = new MockEnvironment().withProperty("x", "y"); // 无旁路 profile = 严格 + assertThatThrownBy(() -> new JwtSecretSafetyCheck( + props(JwtSecretSafetyCheck.DEV_DEFAULT_SECRET), env)) + .isInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class) + .hasMessageContaining("EIP4_AUTH_JWT_SECRET"); + } + + @Test + void prod_profile下开发默认密钥_拒启动() { + MockEnvironment env = new MockEnvironment(); + env.setActiveProfiles("prod"); + assertThatThrownBy(() -> new JwtSecretSafetyCheck( + props(JwtSecretSafetyCheck.DEV_DEFAULT_SECRET), env)) + .isInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class); + } + + @Test + void 旁路profile下开发默认密钥_放行() { + for (String profile : new String[] {"dev", "local", "ci", "parity"}) { + MockEnvironment env = new MockEnvironment(); + env.setActiveProfiles(profile); + assertThatCode(() -> new JwtSecretSafetyCheck( + props(JwtSecretSafetyCheck.DEV_DEFAULT_SECRET), env)) + .as("旁路 profile " + profile + " 下默认密钥应放行") + .doesNotThrowAnyException(); + } + } + + @Test + void 严格profile下强密钥_放行() { + MockEnvironment env = new MockEnvironment(); + env.setActiveProfiles("prod"); + assertThatCode(() -> new JwtSecretSafetyCheck( + props("a-strong-random-production-secret-key-0123456789-abcdef"), env)) + .doesNotThrowAnyException(); + } +} diff --git a/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfileTest.java b/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfileTest.java index a860fef..a5282f3 100644 --- a/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfileTest.java +++ b/platform-auth/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/auth/security/SecurityProfileTest.java @@ -18,11 +18,13 @@ import org.springframework.security.web.FilterChainProxy; import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse; /** - * 安全链按 profile 装配的断言: + * 安全链按 profile 装配的断言(P0 fail-safe 修复后): *

* 用 WebApplicationContextRunner 直接装载 SecurityConfig + 真实 Security 自动配置, * 取出 springSecurityFilterChain 跑 Mock 请求观察拦截结果,不需起整 Boot 应用。 @@ -83,13 +85,29 @@ class SecurityProfileTest { } @Test - void 非生产链开启测试旁路_无令牌放行() { - // 无 active profile → devFilterChain(@Profile("!prod")) + void 未设profile_fail_safe默认严格_受保护路径无令牌被拒() { + // P0 修复:无 active profile → 严格链(@Profile(SecurityProfiles.STRICT)),不再 fail-open 全放行 runner().run(ctx -> { assertThat(ctx).hasNotFailed(); assertThat(statusThroughChain(ctx, "GET", "/api/entity/EIP4PT_TASK/list")) - .as("非生产 profile:permitAll 测试通道开启,无令牌应放行(对拍 CI 依赖)") - .isEqualTo(200); + .as("未设 profile:fail-safe 默认必须强制认证,无令牌被拒为 401(旧实现此处 fail-open 放行)") + .isEqualTo(401); + // 放行清单在严格默认链下仍开 + assertThat(statusThroughChain(ctx, "POST", "/api/auth/login")) + .as("登录端点须放行").isEqualTo(200); }); } + + @Test + void 显式旁路profile开启测试通道_无令牌放行() { + // dev/local/ci/parity 任一激活 → devFilterChain(@Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS)) + for (String profile : new String[] {"dev", "local", "ci", "parity"}) { + runner().withPropertyValues("spring.profiles.active=" + profile).run(ctx -> { + assertThat(ctx).hasNotFailed(); + assertThat(statusThroughChain(ctx, "GET", "/api/entity/EIP4PT_TASK/list")) + .as("旁路 profile(" + profile + "):permitAll 测试通道开启,无令牌应放行(对拍 CI 依赖)") + .isEqualTo(200); + }); + } + } } From 1f2365fa26cc41c534d2a3df9bcf8fca54cce0f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhengwr Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:41:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] =?UTF-8?q?security(P0=E2=91=A1):=20buildCtx=20JWT=20?= =?UTF-8?q?=E8=BA=AB=E4=BB=BD=E6=9D=83=E5=A8=81,=E5=85=B3=20asUser/roles?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=E5=86=92=E5=85=85=E6=8F=90=E6=9D=83(IDOR)?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit EntityController 与孪生 PickerController 的 buildCtx 调换优先级:JWT 已绑定的认证身份恒优先,客户端 asUser/roles 仅在无 JWT 身份时(非生产旁路)生效。杜绝已认证用户传 asUser=他人/roles=ADMIN 冒充提权读越权数据。PickerController 实例由独立安全评审揪出(原架构评审 under-scope)。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- .../metadata/web/EntityController.java | 24 +++++---- .../metadata/web/PickerController.java | 27 ++++++---- .../web/EntityControllerWhitelistTest.java | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ .../metadata/web/PickerControllerTest.java | 33 ++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityController.java index 3b957b8..e4cf730 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityController.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityController.java @@ -218,7 +218,21 @@ public class EntityController { * */ private Properties buildCtx(String asUser, String roles, String asDepart, String asOrg) { - // 1) 显式 asUser 测试通道优先(保持 C2 既有行为不变) + // P0 修复(2026-06-24 架构评审):JWT 已绑定的认证身份【权威】,一律优先于客户端传入的 + // asUser/roles —— 杜绝「已认证用户传 asUser=他人 / roles=ADMIN 冒充提权」(IDOR + 越权)。 + // + // 1) JWT 过滤器已绑定的请求级身份(任何非空 CURRENTUSER,含 ADMIN)→ 直接复用,忽略 asUser/roles。 + // 含 ADMIN:认证为 ADMIN 即用 ADMIN 自身视角(引擎对 ADMIN 不做行级过滤),asUser 同样不生效。 + Properties bound = UserSession.get(); + if (bound != null) { + String cu = bound.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER); + if (cu != null && !cu.isBlank()) { + return bound; + } + } + // 2) 无 JWT 身份时的 asUser/roles 测试通道。【仅非生产 permitAll 旁路可达】:严格链要求认证, + // 带令牌必经上面第 1 步;故在 prod / 默认严格链下,匿名请求根本进不来,本分支结构上不可达。 + // 供对拍框架免令牌按指定用户/角色重放(驱动 POJOCRUDServiceImpl 行级过滤)。 if (asUser != null && !asUser.isBlank()) { Properties ctx = new Properties(); ctx.setProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER, asUser); @@ -241,14 +255,6 @@ public class EntityController { ctx.put(LoggedInUser.ROLES, roleList); return ctx; } - // 2) JWT 过滤器已绑定的请求级上下文(非 ADMIN 真实用户)→ 复用,驱动行级过滤 - Properties bound = UserSession.get(); - if (bound != null) { - String cu = bound.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER); - if (cu != null && !cu.isBlank() && !LoggedInUser.ADMIN.trim().equals(cu.trim())) { - return bound; - } - } // 3) 默认 ADMIN 视角(无令牌、无 asUser) return UserSession.getAdmin(); } diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerController.java index d423527..e5f4d32 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerController.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerController.java @@ -859,14 +859,27 @@ public class PickerController { } /** - * 行级权限上下文构造,与 {@link EntityController#buildCtx} 同口径(三级优先): + * 行级权限上下文构造,与 {@link EntityController#buildCtx} 同口径(JWT 身份权威): *
    - *
  1. 显式 {@code asUser}(对拍测试通道)→ 非 ADMIN 视角,触发行级过滤;
  2. - *
  3. JWT 过滤器已绑定的请求级上下文(真实用户,非 ADMIN)→ 复用;
  4. + *
  5. JWT 过滤器已绑定的请求级身份(任何非空 CURRENTUSER,含 ADMIN)→ 直接复用,忽略 asUser/roles;
  6. + *
  7. 无 JWT 身份时的 asUser/roles 测试通道(仅非生产 permitAll 旁路可达,供对拍免令牌重放);
  8. *
  9. 都没有 → ADMIN 视角(不过滤)。
  10. *
+ * + *

P0 修复(2026-06-24 架构评审 followup,安全评审揪出的 EntityController 孪生实例): + * JWT 已绑定的认证身份【权威】,一律优先于客户端传入的 asUser/roles——杜绝「已认证用户传 + * asUser=他人 / roles=ADMIN 经 picker list/resolve 冒充提权读取越权数据」(IDOR + 越权)。 */ private Properties buildCtx(String asUser, String roles, String asDepart, String asOrg) { + // 1) JWT 绑定身份恒优先(含 ADMIN),忽略客户端 asUser/roles + Properties bound = UserSession.get(); + if (bound != null) { + String cu = bound.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER); + if (cu != null && !cu.isBlank()) { + return bound; + } + } + // 2) 无 JWT 身份时的 asUser/roles 测试通道(仅非生产旁路可达;prod 严格链要求认证,结构上不可达) if (asUser != null && !asUser.isBlank()) { Properties ctx = new Properties(); ctx.setProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER, asUser); @@ -887,13 +900,7 @@ public class PickerController { ctx.put(LoggedInUser.ROLES, roleList); return ctx; } - Properties bound = UserSession.get(); - if (bound != null) { - String cu = bound.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER); - if (cu != null && !cu.isBlank() && !LoggedInUser.ADMIN.trim().equals(cu.trim())) { - return bound; - } - } + // 3) 默认 ADMIN 视角 return UserSession.getAdmin(); } diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityControllerWhitelistTest.java b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityControllerWhitelistTest.java index b1bca05..674325d 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityControllerWhitelistTest.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/EntityControllerWhitelistTest.java @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.bean.GeneralPOJO; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.service.POJOCRUDService; +import com.dsasp.server.common.user.service.LoggedInUser; +import com.dsasp.server.common.util.UserSession; import com.eip4.platform.metadata.security.IdentifierWhitelist; import com.eip4.platform.metadata.security.IdentifierWhitelistExceptionHandler; import com.eip4.platform.metadata.security.IllegalIdentifierException; @@ -165,6 +167,56 @@ class EntityControllerWhitelistTest { assertFalse(String.valueOf(resp.getBody().get("msg")).contains("'")); } + @Test + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + void P0_JWT身份权威_忽略客户端asUser冒充提权() { + IdentifierWhitelist wl = mock(IdentifierWhitelist.class); + POJOCRUDService engine = mock(POJOCRUDService.class); + when(engine.listSelect(any(), eq(TABLE), any(Properties.class))).thenReturn(new HashMap<>()); + EntityController c = new EntityController(engine, wl, + mock(JdbcTemplate.class), mock(PickerController.class)); + + // 模拟 JwtAuthFilter 已绑定真实非 ADMIN 用户 userA 到引擎上下文 + Properties jwtBound = new Properties(); + jwtBound.setProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER, "userA"); + UserSession.set(jwtBound); + try { + // 攻击:已认证 userA 传 asUser=ADMIN&roles=ADMIN 试图冒充提权 + c.list(TABLE, 1, 10, "ADMIN", "ADMIN", null, null, null, null, new HashMap<>()); + + ArgumentCaptor ctxCap = ArgumentCaptor.forClass(Properties.class); + verify(engine).listSelect(any(), eq(TABLE), ctxCap.capture()); + Properties used = ctxCap.getValue(); + assertEquals("userA", used.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER), + "必须以 JWT 身份 userA 为准,绝不采用客户端 asUser=ADMIN"); + assertFalse(used.containsKey(LoggedInUser.ROLES), + "客户端 roles=ADMIN 必须被忽略,不得注入 ADMIN 角色"); + } finally { + UserSession.remove(); + } + } + + @Test + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + void 无JWT身份时asUser测试通道仍生效_对拍依赖() { + IdentifierWhitelist wl = mock(IdentifierWhitelist.class); + POJOCRUDService engine = mock(POJOCRUDService.class); + when(engine.listSelect(any(), eq(TABLE), any(Properties.class))).thenReturn(new HashMap<>()); + EntityController c = new EntityController(engine, wl, + mock(JdbcTemplate.class), mock(PickerController.class)); + + // 无 JWT 绑定(对拍免令牌路径):asUser/roles 通道生效 + UserSession.remove(); + c.list(TABLE, 1, 10, "userB", "ROLE_X", null, null, null, null, new HashMap<>()); + + ArgumentCaptor ctxCap = ArgumentCaptor.forClass(Properties.class); + verify(engine).listSelect(any(), eq(TABLE), ctxCap.capture()); + Properties used = ctxCap.getValue(); + assertEquals("userB", used.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER), + "无 JWT 身份时 asUser 测试通道生效(对拍框架依赖)"); + assertEquals(List.of("ROLE_X"), used.get(LoggedInUser.ROLES)); + } + /** 单字段 GeneralPOJO 桩:主键 + 一个引用列 MENUROOT=值。 */ private static GeneralPOJO refRow(String id, String menuRoot) { GeneralPOJO p = mock(GeneralPOJO.class); diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerControllerTest.java b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerControllerTest.java index 2ee58f3..a71a74e 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerControllerTest.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PickerControllerTest.java @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.bean.SYS_Entity; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.service.DataDicService; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.service.POJOCRUDService; import com.dsasp.server.common.user.service.LoggedInUser; +import com.dsasp.server.common.util.UserSession; import com.dsasp.server.common.exception.PrivilegeException; import com.eip4.platform.metadata.flow.UserColumnResolver; import com.eip4.platform.metadata.security.IdentifierWhitelist; @@ -319,6 +320,38 @@ class PickerControllerTest { assertTrue(roles.contains("role-a") && roles.contains("role-b")); } + @Test + @DisplayName("6b. P0:JWT 身份权威 → 忽略客户端 asUser/roles 冒充提权(EntityController 孪生修复)") + void jwtIdentityOverridesClientAsUser() { + POJOCRUDService engine = mock(POJOCRUDService.class); + DataDicService dic = mock(DataDicService.class); + IdentifierWhitelist wl = mock(IdentifierWhitelist.class); + when(dic.getReferenceEntityTableName(REF_ID)).thenReturn(TABLE); + when(engine.listSelect(any(), eq(TABLE), any(Properties.class))).thenReturn(engineResult()); + seedPoInfoCache(TABLE, fakeInfo()); + PickerController c = new PickerController(engine, dic, wl, emptyTemplateJdbc(), + new UserColumnResolver(emptyTemplateJdbc())); + + // 模拟 JwtAuthFilter 已绑定真实用户 userA 到引擎上下文 + Properties jwtBound = new Properties(); + jwtBound.setProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER, "userA"); + UserSession.set(jwtBound); + try { + // 攻击:已认证 userA 经 picker 传 asUser=victim&roles=ADMIN 试图冒充提权 + c.list(REF_ID, null, 1, 20, null, null, null, "victim", "ADMIN", null, null, null); + + ArgumentCaptor ctxCap = ArgumentCaptor.forClass(Properties.class); + verify(engine).listSelect(any(), eq(TABLE), ctxCap.capture()); + Properties ctx = ctxCap.getValue(); + assertEquals("userA", ctx.getProperty(LoggedInUser.CURRENTUSER), + "必须以 JWT 身份 userA 为准,绝不采用客户端 asUser=victim"); + assertFalse(ctx.containsKey(LoggedInUser.ROLES), + "客户端 roles=ADMIN 必须被忽略,不得注入 ADMIN 角色"); + } finally { + UserSession.remove(); // 防 ThreadLocal 泄漏污染同线程其余用例 + } + } + @Test @DisplayName("7. 引用实体无主键 → 拒绝作选择窗数据源(400)") void rejectsEntityWithoutKey() { From 980d83ed15747aba9b342edaa7e2f049e32b62e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhengwr Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:41:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] =?UTF-8?q?security(P0=E2=91=A2):=20=E8=84=9A=E6=9C=AC?= =?UTF-8?q?=E7=AB=AF=E7=82=B9=E6=8B=86=E5=88=86=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=20RCE=20?= =?UTF-8?q?+=20=E8=B7=AF=E5=BE=84=E7=A9=BF=E8=B6=8A=E5=AE=88=E5=8D=AB=20+?= =?UTF-8?q?=20Poc=20=E6=8E=A7=E5=88=B6=E5=99=A8=E9=97=A8=E7=A6=81?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 拆 ScriptExecuteController(执行请求体任意 Groovy=RCE)为 @Profile(BYPASS) 仅非生产装配;生产改写脚本重放迁至新 ScriptReplayController(只取脚本库内已审产物)。RewrittenScriptStore.load 加 templateId 路径包含校验(resolve+normalize+startsWith,+NUL 字节兜底)防穿越读库外脚本。三个 Poc*Controller(含裸拼 DROP TABLE)全 @Profile(BYPASS)。抽 ScriptFacadeRunner 共享。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- .../metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStore.java | 15 +- .../metadata/script/ScriptFacadeRunner.java | 36 ++++ .../metadata/web/PocMasterSubController.java | 3 + .../metadata/web/PocScriptTestController.java | 3 + .../metadata/web/PocWriteTestController.java | 8 + .../metadata/web/ScriptExecuteController.java | 125 ++---------- .../metadata/web/ScriptReplayController.java | 100 ++++++++++ .../script/RewrittenScriptStoreTest.java | 16 ++ .../web/ScriptExecuteControllerTest.java | 161 ++------------- .../web/ScriptReplayControllerTest.java | 183 ++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 390 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) create mode 100644 platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/ScriptFacadeRunner.java create mode 100644 platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayController.java create mode 100644 platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayControllerTest.java diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStore.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStore.java index 9caacf6..f5a46fe 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStore.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStore.java @@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ public class RewrittenScriptStore { public RewrittenScriptStore( @Value("${eip4.script.rewritten-root:tools/s3_rewriter/output/rewritten}") String rewrittenRoot) { - this.root = Path.of(rewrittenRoot); + // normalize 一次,后续 load 用 startsWith(root) 做路径包含校验防 ../ 穿越。 + this.root = Path.of(rewrittenRoot).normalize(); } /** @@ -47,8 +48,16 @@ public class RewrittenScriptStore { if (templateId == null || templateId.isBlank()) { return null; } - Path dir = root.resolve(templateId); - if (!Files.isDirectory(dir)) { + // P0 安全(2026-06-24 架构评审):templateId 来自请求体,resolve 后 normalize 并校验仍在 + // root 之内,防 `../../` 穿越读取脚本库外任意 .groovy 文件并交保真层执行(路径穿越→RCE)。 + Path dir; + try { + dir = root.resolve(templateId).normalize(); + } catch (java.nio.file.InvalidPathException e) { + // 非法路径字符(如 NUL 字节)→ 当作未找到,优雅降级而非 500。 + return null; + } + if (!dir.startsWith(root) || !Files.isDirectory(dir)) { return null; } String prefix = seq + "."; diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/ScriptFacadeRunner.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/ScriptFacadeRunner.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4854a27 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/ScriptFacadeRunner.java @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +package com.eip4.platform.metadata.script; + +import java.util.List; +import java.util.Map; + +import javax.script.Bindings; + +import com.dsasp.server.dataDic.binding.ScriptingEnginesManager; + +/** + * 脚本 facade 执行的共享原语:把脚本经保真层 {@link ScriptingEnginesManager} 执行, + * 行数据上下文 + facade 动词注入 {@link Bindings},返回捕获的 amis 事件动作指令。 + * + *

P0 拆分(2026-06-24 架构评审)后,「生产改写脚本重放」({@code ScriptReplayController})与 + * 「开发任意脚本执行」({@code ScriptExecuteController},@Profile 旁路限定)共用本原语,避免重复。 + */ +public final class ScriptFacadeRunner { + + private ScriptFacadeRunner() { + } + + /** + * 用 facade 动词表执行脚本,返回捕获的 amis 指令。 + * + * @param key 缓存/诊断键(模板/序号派生),允许 null + * @param script 脚本正文 + * @param item 当前行数据域(facade 动词读写) + */ + public static List> run(String key, String script, Map item) { + ScriptFacade facade = new ScriptFacade(item); + Bindings bindings = facade.buildBindings(item); + ScriptingEnginesManager.getScriptingEnginesManager() + .evaluateGroovy(key, script, bindings); + return facade.getCommands(); + } +} diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocMasterSubController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocMasterSubController.java index 43c7fde..defb4fd 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocMasterSubController.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocMasterSubController.java @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import java.util.List; import java.util.Map; import java.util.Properties; +import org.springframework.context.annotation.Profile; import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam; @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.bean.GeneralPOJO; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.service.POJOCRUDService; import com.dsasp.server.common.util.UserSession; +import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.SecurityProfiles; /** * WS1 主子表级联验证:SYS_DATA_LOG(主) → DETAILLIST → SYS_DATA_LOGITEM(子)。 @@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ import com.dsasp.server.common.util.UserSession; * 测试行以 COLUMNNAME=EIP4POC_* 标记,结束后行数断言复原,残留兜底清理。 */ @RestController +@Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS) public class PocMasterSubController { // 首选 SYS_DATA_LOG 对在 diff 更新时暴露了选表不当:其子表为 insert-only 设计 diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocScriptTestController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocScriptTestController.java index 3c119de..7228961 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocScriptTestController.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocScriptTestController.java @@ -11,12 +11,14 @@ import javax.script.SimpleBindings; import org.dom4j.Document; import org.dom4j.DocumentHelper; import org.dom4j.Element; +import org.springframework.context.annotation.Profile; import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; import com.dsasp.server.dataDic.binding.ScriptingEnginesManager; +import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.SecurityProfiles; import groovy.lang.Closure; @@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ import groovy.lang.Closure; * 指令列表——即「脚本文本零修改,换 facade 实现」方案的最小实证。 */ @RestController +@Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS) public class PocScriptTestController { private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate; diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocWriteTestController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocWriteTestController.java index 8e472d7..97381fb 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocWriteTestController.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/PocWriteTestController.java @@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ import java.util.List; import java.util.Map; import java.util.Properties; +import org.springframework.context.annotation.Profile; import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; +import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.SecurityProfiles; + import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.bean.GeneralPOJO; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.service.DataDicService; import com.dsasp.server.common.dataDic.service.POJOCRUDService; @@ -22,8 +25,13 @@ import com.dsasp.server.dataDic.bean.Entity; * WS1 写路径一键验证(PoC 方案 3.1 步骤 7): * 克隆既有小实体的元数据 → 动态生成并执行 CREATE TABLE → CRUD 往返 → 全量清理。 * 所有产物以 target 表名隔离(默认 EIP4POCTEST),结束后物理表与元数据一并删除。 + * + *

P0 安全(2026-06-24 架构评审):本 PoC 控制器 {@code cleanup} 以 + * {@code DROP TABLE IF EXISTS } 裸拼请求参数(可传 {@code target=SYS_USER} 任意删表), + * 严禁随生产 jar 装配。故 {@code @Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS)}——仅 dev/local/ci/parity 装配。 */ @RestController +@Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS) public class PocWriteTestController { private final DataDicService dataDicService; diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteController.java index 587889f..2643820 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteController.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteController.java @@ -4,56 +4,40 @@ import java.util.LinkedHashMap; import java.util.List; import java.util.Map; -import javax.script.Bindings; - import org.dom4j.Document; import org.dom4j.DocumentHelper; import org.dom4j.Element; -import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired; +import org.springframework.context.annotation.Profile; import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; -import com.dsasp.server.dataDic.binding.ScriptingEnginesManager; -import com.eip4.platform.metadata.flow.EnumDisplayResolver; -import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.RewrittenScriptStore; -import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.ScriptFacade; +import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.SecurityProfiles; +import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.ScriptFacadeRunner; /** - * 脚本执行端点(P4 脚本迁移线 任务2 集成)。 + * 脚本开发/调试执行端点——执行请求体里的任意脚本,仅供改写验证用。 * - *

把(改写后的)Groovy 脚本经保真层 {@link ScriptingEnginesManager} 执行,行数据上下文 + - * 31 个 facade 动词由 {@link ScriptFacade} 注入 {@link Bindings}: - *

    - *
  • 服务端语义动词(getFieldValue 等)在服务端求值;
  • - *
  • UI 语义动词(setFieldVisible/showToast/addSubTableButton…)捕获为 amis 事件动作 - * 指令 JSON 数组(actionType/componentId/args)返回前端。
  • - *
+ *

P0 安全(2026-06-24 架构评审):本控制器的 {@code /api/script/execute} + * 直接执行请求体携带的任意 Groovy(= 远程代码执行 RCE),严禁随生产 jar 装配。故全类 + * {@code @Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS)}——仅 dev/local/ci/parity 装配,生产不可达。 * - *

架构:本控制器与 {@link ScriptFacade} 均在现代层 {@code com.eip4.*},仅向保真层注入闭包, + *

生产运行时的「改写后脚本重放」(脚本来源 = 脚本库内已审产物,非请求体)已隔离到 + * {@code ScriptReplayController}(/api/script/execute-template,无 @Profile,随生产装配)。 + * + *

架构:本控制器在现代层 {@code com.eip4.*},仅经 {@link ScriptFacadeRunner} 向保真层注入闭包, * 不改 {@code com.dsasp} 源码。 */ @RestController +@Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS) public class ScriptExecuteController { private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate; - private final RewrittenScriptStore rewrittenScriptStore; - /** 小修#2:脚本执行前给 item 注入枚举列显示串(复刻老系统 grid 行 item 语义),修 {@code item['ISPLACE']=="未归档"} 类脚本。 */ - private final EnumDisplayResolver enumDisplayResolver; - @Autowired - public ScriptExecuteController(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate, RewrittenScriptStore rewrittenScriptStore, - EnumDisplayResolver enumDisplayResolver) { + public ScriptExecuteController(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate) { this.jdbcTemplate = jdbcTemplate; - this.rewrittenScriptStore = rewrittenScriptStore; - this.enumDisplayResolver = enumDisplayResolver; - } - - /** 兼容旧 2 参构造(单测/旧接线):从 jdbcTemplate 自建枚举显示值解析器。 */ - public ScriptExecuteController(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate, RewrittenScriptStore rewrittenScriptStore) { - this(jdbcTemplate, rewrittenScriptStore, new EnumDisplayResolver(jdbcTemplate)); } /** @@ -76,7 +60,7 @@ public class ScriptExecuteController { ? (Map) body.get("item") : new LinkedHashMap<>(); try { - List> commands = runWithFacade(null, script, item); + List> commands = ScriptFacadeRunner.run(null, script, item); resp.put("passed", true); resp.put("item", item); resp.put("commands", commands); @@ -92,9 +76,6 @@ public class ScriptExecuteController { /** * 按模板名从客户库取「库内原始脚本」执行(P4-2 端到端验证端点,保留兼容)。 * - *

注:P4-5 改写后脚本挂回链路走 {@link #executeTemplateRewritten}(按 templateId/seq 取 - * 改写产物);本端点按模板名取库内 XML 原始脚本,端点路径区隔为 {@code -by-name}。 - * * @param template 模板名(VIEW_TEMPLATE.NAME) * @param state 注入 item.ISPLACE 的取值,便于驱动分支 */ @@ -115,89 +96,13 @@ public class ScriptExecuteController { } resp.put("template", template); resp.put("scriptSource", script); - List> commands = runWithFacade("tpl:" + template, script, item); + List> commands = ScriptFacadeRunner.run("tpl:" + template, script, item); resp.put("commands", commands); resp.put("commandCount", commands.size()); resp.put("passed", true); return resp; } - /** - * 改写后脚本挂回 onEvent 重放链路的执行端点(P4-5)。 - * - *

转换器在 amis 页面 onEvent 里配置「调本端点,传 templateId/seq/item」;本端点按 - * {@code (templateId, seq)} 从改写后脚本库({@link RewrittenScriptStore})取脚本正文, - * 经 facade 执行,返回 amis 事件动作指令数组供前端逐条重放(show/hidden/setValue/setOptions/toast 等)。 - * - *

请求体:{@code {"templateId":"021e...","seq":2,"item":{"STORE_ID":"X",...}}}
- * 返回 :{@code {"commands":[{actionType,componentId,args},...], "passed":true, "item":{...}}} - * - * @param body templateId(落盘目录名)+ seq(脚本序号)+ item(amis 表单当前数据域) - */ - @PostMapping("/api/script/execute-template") - public Map executeTemplateRewritten(@RequestBody Map body) { - Map resp = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - String templateId = body.get("templateId") == null ? null : String.valueOf(body.get("templateId")); - if (templateId == null || templateId.isBlank()) { - resp.put("passed", false); - resp.put("error", "缺少 templateId"); - return resp; - } - int seq = body.get("seq") instanceof Number n ? n.intValue() : parseSeq(body.get("seq")); - @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") - Map item = body.get("item") instanceof Map - ? (Map) body.get("item") : new LinkedHashMap<>(); - - String script = rewrittenScriptStore.load(templateId, seq); - if (script == null || script.isBlank()) { - // WS-B C1-b:脚本未找到(残余缺脚本/seq 偏差)退化为「无联动」no-op,而非用户可见 ajax 报错。 - // 转换期 fail-closed 已尽量不挂缺文件的绑定;此处兜底任何残余,返空 commands → 前端无动作可重放。 - resp.put("templateId", templateId); - resp.put("seq", seq); - resp.put("passed", true); - resp.put("commands", List.of()); - resp.put("commandCount", 0); - resp.put("note", "改写后脚本未找到,按无联动处理(no-op): templateId=" + templateId + " seq=" + seq); - return resp; - } - // 小修#2:脚本执行前把 item 里枚举列的裸码换成显示串(复刻老系统 grid 行 item 语义),使 - // onselectedscript 里 `item['ISPLACE'] == "未归档"` 类显示串比较成立(否则裸码 0 != "未归档" - // → 文件归档等按钮永不点亮)。表名从 item 的 _ID 主键反推;失败静默跳过不影响主路径。 - if (enumDisplayResolver != null) { - enumDisplayResolver.enrichItem(null, item); - } - resp.put("templateId", templateId); - resp.put("seq", seq); - try { - List> commands = runWithFacade("rw:" + templateId + ":" + seq, script, item); - resp.put("passed", true); - resp.put("item", item); - resp.put("commands", commands); - resp.put("commandCount", commands.size()); - } catch (Exception e) { - resp.put("passed", false); - resp.put("error", e.getMessage()); - } - return resp; - } - - private static int parseSeq(Object raw) { - try { - return raw == null ? 1 : Integer.parseInt(String.valueOf(raw).trim()); - } catch (NumberFormatException e) { - return 1; - } - } - - /** 用 facade 动词表执行脚本,返回捕获的 amis 指令。 */ - private List> runWithFacade(String key, String script, Map item) { - ScriptFacade facade = new ScriptFacade(item); - Bindings bindings = facade.buildBindings(item); - ScriptingEnginesManager.getScriptingEnginesManager() - .evaluateGroovy(key, script, bindings); - return facade.getCommands(); - } - /** 从 VIEW_TEMPLATE 取模板第一段实质脚本(getText 保留换行,见迁移手册 5.3)。 */ private String extractScript(String template) throws Exception { List xmls = jdbcTemplate.queryForList( diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayController.java b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayController.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e36fec --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-metadata/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayController.java @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +package com.eip4.platform.metadata.web; + +import java.util.LinkedHashMap; +import java.util.List; +import java.util.Map; + +import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping; +import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody; +import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; + +import com.eip4.platform.metadata.flow.EnumDisplayResolver; +import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.RewrittenScriptStore; +import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.ScriptFacadeRunner; + +/** + * 改写后脚本挂回 onEvent 重放执行端点(P4-5)——生产运行时依赖。 + * + *

转换器在 amis 页面 onEvent 里配置「调本端点,传 templateId/seq/item」;本端点按 + * {@code (templateId, seq)} 从改写后脚本库({@link RewrittenScriptStore})取已落盘、已审 + * 的脚本正文,经 facade 执行,返回 amis 事件动作指令数组供前端逐条重放。 + * + *

P0 安全拆分(2026-06-24 架构评审):本控制器只重放脚本库内脚本 + * (脚本来源 = S3 改写器落盘产物,非请求体),不接受请求体里的任意脚本,故可随生产 jar 装配。 + * 「执行请求体任意 Groovy(RCE)」的开发端点已隔离到 {@code ScriptExecuteController} + * (@Profile 旁路限定,生产不装配)。{@link RewrittenScriptStore} 另对 {@code templateId} 做 + * 路径包含校验,防 {@code ../} 穿越读任意 {@code .groovy} 文件。 + */ +@RestController +public class ScriptReplayController { + + private final RewrittenScriptStore rewrittenScriptStore; + /** 脚本执行前给 item 注入枚举列显示串(复刻老系统 grid 行 item 语义),修 {@code item['ISPLACE']=="未归档"} 类脚本。 */ + private final EnumDisplayResolver enumDisplayResolver; + + public ScriptReplayController(RewrittenScriptStore rewrittenScriptStore, + EnumDisplayResolver enumDisplayResolver) { + this.rewrittenScriptStore = rewrittenScriptStore; + this.enumDisplayResolver = enumDisplayResolver; + } + + /** + * 改写后脚本挂回 onEvent 重放链路的执行端点(P4-5)。 + * + *

请求体:{@code {"templateId":"021e...","seq":2,"item":{"STORE_ID":"X",...}}}
+ * 返回 :{@code {"commands":[{actionType,componentId,args},...], "passed":true, "item":{...}}} + */ + @PostMapping("/api/script/execute-template") + public Map executeTemplateRewritten(@RequestBody Map body) { + Map resp = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + String templateId = body.get("templateId") == null ? null : String.valueOf(body.get("templateId")); + if (templateId == null || templateId.isBlank()) { + resp.put("passed", false); + resp.put("error", "缺少 templateId"); + return resp; + } + int seq = body.get("seq") instanceof Number n ? n.intValue() : parseSeq(body.get("seq")); + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + Map item = body.get("item") instanceof Map + ? (Map) body.get("item") : new LinkedHashMap<>(); + + String script = rewrittenScriptStore.load(templateId, seq); + if (script == null || script.isBlank()) { + // WS-B C1-b:脚本未找到(残余缺脚本/seq 偏差)退化为「无联动」no-op,而非用户可见 ajax 报错。 + resp.put("templateId", templateId); + resp.put("seq", seq); + resp.put("passed", true); + resp.put("commands", List.of()); + resp.put("commandCount", 0); + resp.put("note", "改写后脚本未找到,按无联动处理(no-op): templateId=" + templateId + " seq=" + seq); + return resp; + } + // 执行前把 item 里枚举列的裸码换成显示串(复刻老系统 grid 行 item 语义),使 + // onselectedscript 里 `item['ISPLACE'] == "未归档"` 类显示串比较成立。失败静默跳过不影响主路径。 + if (enumDisplayResolver != null) { + enumDisplayResolver.enrichItem(null, item); + } + resp.put("templateId", templateId); + resp.put("seq", seq); + try { + List> commands = + ScriptFacadeRunner.run("rw:" + templateId + ":" + seq, script, item); + resp.put("passed", true); + resp.put("item", item); + resp.put("commands", commands); + resp.put("commandCount", commands.size()); + } catch (Exception e) { + resp.put("passed", false); + resp.put("error", e.getMessage()); + } + return resp; + } + + private static int parseSeq(Object raw) { + try { + return raw == null ? 1 : Integer.parseInt(String.valueOf(raw).trim()); + } catch (NumberFormatException e) { + return 1; + } + } +} diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStoreTest.java b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStoreTest.java index eb55c66..10678f6 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStoreTest.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/script/RewrittenScriptStoreTest.java @@ -59,4 +59,20 @@ class RewrittenScriptStoreTest { assertNull(store.load("", 1)); assertFalse(store.load("no-such-tid", 9) != null); } + + /** P0:templateId 路径穿越(../)不得读取脚本库根之外的 .groovy 文件,返回 null。 */ + @Test + void load_路径穿越templateId拒绝读库外文件(@TempDir Path tmp) throws IOException { + Path root = tmp.resolve("rewritten"); + Files.createDirectories(root); + // 在 root 之外(同 tmp 下的兄弟目录)放一个真实可读的脚本目录 + Path evil = tmp.resolve("evil"); + Files.createDirectories(evil); + Files.writeString(evil.resolve("1.x.groovy"), "showToast(\"pwned\");", StandardCharsets.UTF_8); + + RewrittenScriptStore store = new RewrittenScriptStore(root.toString()); + // ../evil 解析后落在 root 之外 → 包含校验拒绝 → null(即便目标文件真实存在) + assertNull(store.load("../evil", 1), "穿越出脚本库根必须拒绝"); + assertNull(store.load("../../evil", 1)); + } } diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteControllerTest.java b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteControllerTest.java index 16d532a..2182346 100644 --- a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteControllerTest.java +++ b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptExecuteControllerTest.java @@ -1,169 +1,28 @@ package com.eip4.platform.metadata.web; import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals; -import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse; -import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNotNull; -import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull; -import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue; import static org.mockito.Mockito.mock; -import java.io.IOException; -import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; -import java.nio.file.Files; -import java.nio.file.Path; import java.util.LinkedHashMap; import java.util.List; import java.util.Map; import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; -import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir; import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; -import com.eip4.platform.metadata.flow.EnumDisplayResolver; -import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.RewrittenScriptStore; - /** - * P4-5 单测:改写后脚本挂回执行端点(/api/script/execute-template)。 + * 开发/调试脚本执行端点单测(/api/script/execute,执行请求体里的任意脚本)。 * - *

构造一个落盘的改写后脚本(templateId/seq 命名 + 头注释块),经端点取出去头执行, - * 断言返回 amis 事件动作指令数组(actionType/componentId/args),是「改写后脚本挂回」取数→ - * 执行→指令产出的端到端单测(脚本经保真层引擎真实跑通,非桩)。 + *

P0 拆分(2026-06-24 架构评审)后,本控制器 {@code @Profile(SecurityProfiles.BYPASS)} + * 仅 dev/local/ci/parity 装配,生产不可达;改写后脚本「生产重放」端点已迁至 + * {@link ScriptReplayController}(见 {@code ScriptReplayControllerTest})。 */ class ScriptExecuteControllerTest { - private ScriptExecuteController controller(Path root) { - return new ScriptExecuteController(mock(JdbcTemplate.class), new RewrittenScriptStore(root.toString())); - } - - private void writeScript(Path root, String tid, String fileName, String content) throws IOException { - Path dir = root.resolve(tid); - Files.createDirectories(dir); - Files.writeString(dir.resolve(fileName), content, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); - } - @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") @Test - void executeTemplateRewritten_取改写脚本执行产出amis指令(@TempDir Path root) throws IOException { - // 福利保险结算单 seq=1:setFieldVisible("BEGINDATE", false) → hidden - writeScript(root, "0d9eac07", "1.FULL_AUTO.groovy", - "// === EIP4 P4 脚本迁移产出 ===\n// seq : 1\n\nsetFieldVisible(\"BEGINDATE\", false);"); - ScriptExecuteController c = controller(root); - - Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - body.put("templateId", "0d9eac07"); - body.put("seq", 1); - body.put("item", new LinkedHashMap<>()); - Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); - - assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); - List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); - assertEquals(1, cmds.size()); - assertEquals("hidden", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); - assertEquals("BEGINDATE", cmds.get(0).get("componentId")); - } - - @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") - @Test - void executeTemplateRewritten_服务端语义动词从item求值并联动(@TempDir Path root) throws IOException { - // 办公用品领用申请 seq=2:addSubTableButton + bindField(getFieldValue("STORE_ID")) - writeScript(root, "021e3ba7", "2.FULL_AUTO.groovy", - "// header\naddSubTableButton(\"GOODSDETAIL\", \"SELECT\", 0);\n" - + "bindField(\"OLD_STORE_ID\",getFieldValue(\"STORE_ID\"));"); - ScriptExecuteController c = controller(root); - - Map item = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - item.put("STORE_ID", "S-99"); - Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - body.put("templateId", "021e3ba7"); - body.put("seq", "2"); // 字符串 seq 也能解析 - body.put("item", item); - Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); - - assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); - List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); - assertEquals(2, cmds.size()); - assertEquals("addSubTableButton", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); - Map setValue = cmds.get(1); - assertEquals("setValue", setValue.get("actionType")); - assertEquals("OLD_STORE_ID", setValue.get("componentId")); - Map args = (Map) setValue.get("args"); - assertEquals("S-99", args.get("value")); // getFieldValue 从 item 求值闭环 - } - - /** 缺 templateId 是真错 → passed=false + error(保留)。 */ - @Test - void executeTemplateRewritten_缺templateId时passed为false(@TempDir Path root) { - ScriptExecuteController c = controller(root); - - Map noTid = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - Map r1 = c.executeTemplateRewritten(noTid); - assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, r1.get("passed")); - assertNotNull(r1.get("error")); - assertTrue(((String) r1.get("error")).contains("templateId")); - } - - /** WS-B C1-b:脚本未找到(残余缺脚本/seq 偏差)退化为 no-op(passed=true + 空 commands),不报 ajax 错。 */ - @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") - @Test - void executeTemplateRewritten_脚本未找到时退化为noop(@TempDir Path root) { - ScriptExecuteController c = controller(root); - - Map missing = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - missing.put("templateId", "no-such"); - missing.put("seq", 1); - Map r2 = c.executeTemplateRewritten(missing); - assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, r2.get("passed")); // no-op,非用户可见报错 - assertNull(r2.get("error")); // 不再返 error - List> cmds = (List>) r2.get("commands"); - assertTrue(cmds.isEmpty()); // 空 commands → 前端无动作可重放 - assertEquals(0, r2.get("commandCount")); - } - - /** - * 小修#2:执行前 item 枚举裸码 → 显示串,使 onselectedscript 里 {@code item['ISPLACE'] == "未归档"} - * 成立 → 触发 enableButton("文件归档", true)。复刻新闻 ddb75614 文件归档永不点亮根因的修复闭环。 - */ - @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") - @Test - void executeTemplateRewritten_枚举显示值注入使按钮点亮(@TempDir Path root) throws IOException { - // 复刻新闻 seq1 文件归档分支:item['ISPLACE'] 是显示串时点亮文件归档 - writeScript(root, "ddb75614", "1.NO_S3.groovy", - "if (item['ISPLACE'] == \"未归档\") enableButton(\"文件归档\", true);"); - - // 桩 jdbc:ISPLACE→SYS_FILINGUP_STATUS,code 0→未归档 - JdbcTemplate jdbc = mock(JdbcTemplate.class); - org.mockito.Mockito.lenient().when(jdbc.queryForList( - org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.contains("sys_entityattribute"), - org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq("OA_NEWSMANAGE"))) - .thenReturn(List.of(Map.of("col", "ISPLACE", "etype", "SYS_FILINGUP_STATUS"))); - org.mockito.Mockito.lenient().when(jdbc.queryForList( - org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.contains("sys_enumerate"), - org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq("SYS_FILINGUP_STATUS"))) - .thenReturn(List.of(Map.of("codevalue", 0, "codedes", "未归档"))); - - ScriptExecuteController c = new ScriptExecuteController( - jdbc, new RewrittenScriptStore(root.toString()), new EnumDisplayResolver(jdbc)); - - Map item = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - item.put("OA_NEWSMANAGE_ID", "row-1"); - item.put("ISPLACE", 0); // 裸码(_SEARCH 合成流平展的真实形态) - Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); - body.put("templateId", "ddb75614"); - body.put("seq", 1); - body.put("item", item); - - Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); - assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); - List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); - assertEquals(1, cmds.size(), "ISPLACE 富化为「未归档」→ 文件归档点亮 enable 指令"); - assertEquals("文件归档", cmds.get(0).get("componentId")); - assertEquals("enabled", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); - } - - @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") - @Test - void execute_直接执行脚本仍可用(@TempDir Path root) { - ScriptExecuteController c = controller(root); + void execute_直接执行脚本仍可用() { + ScriptExecuteController c = new ScriptExecuteController(mock(JdbcTemplate.class)); Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); body.put("script", "showToast(\"ok\");"); body.put("item", new LinkedHashMap<>()); @@ -172,4 +31,12 @@ class ScriptExecuteControllerTest { List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); assertEquals("toast", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); } + + @Test + void execute_缺script时passed为false() { + ScriptExecuteController c = new ScriptExecuteController(mock(JdbcTemplate.class)); + Map resp = c.execute(new LinkedHashMap<>()); + assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, resp.get("passed")); + assertEquals("缺少 script", resp.get("error")); + } } diff --git a/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayControllerTest.java b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayControllerTest.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9cebb9f --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-metadata/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/metadata/web/ScriptReplayControllerTest.java @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +package com.eip4.platform.metadata.web; + +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals; +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNotNull; +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull; +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue; +import static org.mockito.Mockito.mock; + +import java.io.IOException; +import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; +import java.nio.file.Files; +import java.nio.file.Path; +import java.util.LinkedHashMap; +import java.util.List; +import java.util.Map; + +import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; +import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir; +import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; + +import com.eip4.platform.metadata.flow.EnumDisplayResolver; +import com.eip4.platform.metadata.script.RewrittenScriptStore; + +/** + * P4-5 单测:改写后脚本挂回执行端点(/api/script/execute-template),P0 拆分后落在生产可装配的 + * {@link ScriptReplayController}(脚本只取自脚本库内已审产物,非请求体,故随生产 jar 装配)。 + * + *

构造一个落盘的改写后脚本(templateId/seq 命名 + 头注释块),经端点取出去头执行, + * 断言返回 amis 事件动作指令数组(脚本经保真层引擎真实跑通,非桩)。 + */ +class ScriptReplayControllerTest { + + private ScriptReplayController controller(Path root) { + return new ScriptReplayController(new RewrittenScriptStore(root.toString()), + new EnumDisplayResolver(mock(JdbcTemplate.class))); + } + + private void writeScript(Path root, String tid, String fileName, String content) throws IOException { + Path dir = root.resolve(tid); + Files.createDirectories(dir); + Files.writeString(dir.resolve(fileName), content, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); + } + + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + @Test + void executeTemplateRewritten_取改写脚本执行产出amis指令(@TempDir Path root) throws IOException { + writeScript(root, "0d9eac07", "1.FULL_AUTO.groovy", + "// === EIP4 P4 脚本迁移产出 ===\n// seq : 1\n\nsetFieldVisible(\"BEGINDATE\", false);"); + ScriptReplayController c = controller(root); + + Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + body.put("templateId", "0d9eac07"); + body.put("seq", 1); + body.put("item", new LinkedHashMap<>()); + Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); + + assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); + List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); + assertEquals(1, cmds.size()); + assertEquals("hidden", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); + assertEquals("BEGINDATE", cmds.get(0).get("componentId")); + } + + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + @Test + void executeTemplateRewritten_服务端语义动词从item求值并联动(@TempDir Path root) throws IOException { + writeScript(root, "021e3ba7", "2.FULL_AUTO.groovy", + "// header\naddSubTableButton(\"GOODSDETAIL\", \"SELECT\", 0);\n" + + "bindField(\"OLD_STORE_ID\",getFieldValue(\"STORE_ID\"));"); + ScriptReplayController c = controller(root); + + Map item = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + item.put("STORE_ID", "S-99"); + Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + body.put("templateId", "021e3ba7"); + body.put("seq", "2"); // 字符串 seq 也能解析 + body.put("item", item); + Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); + + assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); + List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); + assertEquals(2, cmds.size()); + assertEquals("addSubTableButton", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); + Map setValue = cmds.get(1); + assertEquals("setValue", setValue.get("actionType")); + assertEquals("OLD_STORE_ID", setValue.get("componentId")); + Map args = (Map) setValue.get("args"); + assertEquals("S-99", args.get("value")); // getFieldValue 从 item 求值闭环 + } + + /** 缺 templateId 是真错 → passed=false + error(保留)。 */ + @Test + void executeTemplateRewritten_缺templateId时passed为false(@TempDir Path root) { + ScriptReplayController c = controller(root); + + Map noTid = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + Map r1 = c.executeTemplateRewritten(noTid); + assertEquals(Boolean.FALSE, r1.get("passed")); + assertNotNull(r1.get("error")); + assertTrue(((String) r1.get("error")).contains("templateId")); + } + + /** WS-B C1-b:脚本未找到退化为 no-op(passed=true + 空 commands),不报 ajax 错。 */ + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + @Test + void executeTemplateRewritten_脚本未找到时退化为noop(@TempDir Path root) { + ScriptReplayController c = controller(root); + + Map missing = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + missing.put("templateId", "no-such"); + missing.put("seq", 1); + Map r2 = c.executeTemplateRewritten(missing); + assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, r2.get("passed")); + assertNull(r2.get("error")); + List> cmds = (List>) r2.get("commands"); + assertTrue(cmds.isEmpty()); + assertEquals(0, r2.get("commandCount")); + } + + /** + * P0:路径穿越的 templateId 不得读取脚本库外文件 → 退化 no-op(RewrittenScriptStore 包含校验)。 + */ + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + @Test + void executeTemplateRewritten_路径穿越templateId退化noop(@TempDir Path tmp) throws IOException { + Path root = tmp.resolve("rewritten"); + Files.createDirectories(root); + // 在 root 之外落一个恶意脚本目录 + Path outsideDir = tmp.resolve("evil"); + Files.createDirectories(outsideDir); + Files.writeString(outsideDir.resolve("1.x.groovy"), "showToast(\"pwned\");", StandardCharsets.UTF_8); + + ScriptReplayController c = new ScriptReplayController( + new RewrittenScriptStore(root.toString()), new EnumDisplayResolver(mock(JdbcTemplate.class))); + Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + body.put("templateId", "../evil"); // 试图穿越出脚本库根 + body.put("seq", 1); + body.put("item", new LinkedHashMap<>()); + Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); + + assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); // no-op(脚本未找到) + List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); + assertTrue(cmds.isEmpty(), "穿越 templateId 必须读不到库外脚本,不得执行"); + } + + /** + * 执行前 item 枚举裸码 → 显示串,使 onselectedscript 里 {@code item['ISPLACE'] == "未归档"} 成立。 + */ + @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") + @Test + void executeTemplateRewritten_枚举显示值注入使按钮点亮(@TempDir Path root) throws IOException { + writeScript(root, "ddb75614", "1.NO_S3.groovy", + "if (item['ISPLACE'] == \"未归档\") enableButton(\"文件归档\", true);"); + + JdbcTemplate jdbc = mock(JdbcTemplate.class); + org.mockito.Mockito.lenient().when(jdbc.queryForList( + org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.contains("sys_entityattribute"), + org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq("OA_NEWSMANAGE"))) + .thenReturn(List.of(Map.of("col", "ISPLACE", "etype", "SYS_FILINGUP_STATUS"))); + org.mockito.Mockito.lenient().when(jdbc.queryForList( + org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.contains("sys_enumerate"), + org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq("SYS_FILINGUP_STATUS"))) + .thenReturn(List.of(Map.of("codevalue", 0, "codedes", "未归档"))); + + ScriptReplayController c = new ScriptReplayController( + new RewrittenScriptStore(root.toString()), new EnumDisplayResolver(jdbc)); + + Map item = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + item.put("OA_NEWSMANAGE_ID", "row-1"); + item.put("ISPLACE", 0); // 裸码 + Map body = new LinkedHashMap<>(); + body.put("templateId", "ddb75614"); + body.put("seq", 1); + body.put("item", item); + + Map resp = c.executeTemplateRewritten(body); + assertEquals(Boolean.TRUE, resp.get("passed")); + List> cmds = (List>) resp.get("commands"); + assertEquals(1, cmds.size(), "ISPLACE 富化为「未归档」→ 文件归档点亮 enable 指令"); + assertEquals("文件归档", cmds.get(0).get("componentId")); + assertEquals("enabled", cmds.get(0).get("actionType")); + } +} From bc9ae8cf445bf81886f8c876c06a3d754e6cd8f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhengwr Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:41:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] =?UTF-8?q?security(P0=E2=91=A2=20followup):=20?= =?UTF-8?q?=E5=85=B3=20TodoController=20advanced-script=20=E7=94=9F?= =?UTF-8?q?=E4=BA=A7=20RCE?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit /api/workflow/process/{id}/advanced-script 执行请求体 Groovy,原无 @Profile/无角色门=任意认证用户 prod RCE(独立安全评审揪出的 ScriptExecuteController 孪生)。注入 Environment + SecurityProfiles.isBypassActive 守卫:严格 profile 直接 amisFail 不执行脚本。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- .../flowgateway/web/TodoController.java | 18 +++++++- .../flowgateway/TodoControllerAmisTest.java | 43 ++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/platform-flow-gateway/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/web/TodoController.java b/platform-flow-gateway/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/web/TodoController.java index 4ca0303..00cd2cf 100644 --- a/platform-flow-gateway/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/web/TodoController.java +++ b/platform-flow-gateway/src/main/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/web/TodoController.java @@ -29,7 +29,10 @@ import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam; import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController; +import org.springframework.core.env.Environment; + import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.AuthPrincipal; +import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.SecurityProfiles; import com.eip4.platform.flowgateway.aggregate.BusinessSummaryService; import com.eip4.platform.flowgateway.aggregate.TodoAggregator; import com.eip4.platform.flowgateway.aggregate.TodoItem; @@ -77,15 +80,18 @@ public class TodoController { private final StatusWriteback statusWriteback; private final BusinessSummaryService businessSummaryService; private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate; + /** P0:判定是否处于非生产旁路 profile,用于关闭生产环境的任意脚本执行端点。 */ + private final Environment environment; public TodoController(TodoAggregator todoAggregator, FlowableClient flowableClient, StatusWriteback statusWriteback, BusinessSummaryService businessSummaryService, - JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate) { + JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate, Environment environment) { this.todoAggregator = todoAggregator; this.flowableClient = flowableClient; this.statusWriteback = statusWriteback; this.businessSummaryService = businessSummaryService; this.jdbcTemplate = jdbcTemplate; + this.environment = environment; } @Operation(summary = "当前用户待办(含候选组待办)", @@ -276,12 +282,20 @@ public class TodoController { } @Operation(summary = "流程监控高级处理脚本", - description = "流程监控页专用:按老系统语义给 Groovy 绑定 processid/businessKey 后执行;失败返回 AMIS status=1。") + description = "流程监控页专用:按老系统语义给 Groovy 绑定 processid/businessKey 后执行;失败返回 AMIS status=1。" + + "【仅非生产旁路 profile 可用:本端点执行请求体里的任意 Groovy(RCE),生产已禁用。】") @PostMapping("/api/workflow/process/{processInstanceId}/advanced-script") public ResponseEntity> runProcessAdvancedScript( @AuthenticationPrincipal AuthPrincipal principal, @PathVariable String processInstanceId, @RequestBody(required = false) GatewayRequests.AdvancedScriptRequest req) { + // P0 安全(2026-06-24 架构评审 followup,安全评审揪出的 ScriptExecuteController 孪生实例): + // 本端点执行请求体携带的任意 Groovy(= 远程代码执行 RCE),严禁在生产可达。 + // 仅 dev/local/ci/parity 旁路 profile 放行;严格(prod/默认)profile 直接拒绝,绝不执行脚本。 + if (!SecurityProfiles.isBypassActive(environment)) { + return ResponseEntity.ok(amisFail( + "流程高级处理脚本仅在非生产环境可用(生产已禁用任意脚本执行)")); + } String script = req == null ? null : trim(req.script); if (script == null || script.isBlank()) { return ResponseEntity.ok(amisFail("请输入高级处理脚本")); diff --git a/platform-flow-gateway/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/TodoControllerAmisTest.java b/platform-flow-gateway/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/TodoControllerAmisTest.java index 7eebaf7..f238113 100644 --- a/platform-flow-gateway/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/TodoControllerAmisTest.java +++ b/platform-flow-gateway/src/test/java/com/eip4/platform/flowgateway/TodoControllerAmisTest.java @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat; import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyString; import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any; import static org.mockito.Mockito.mock; +import static org.mockito.Mockito.never; import static org.mockito.Mockito.verify; import static org.mockito.Mockito.when; @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import java.util.Map; import org.mockito.ArgumentCaptor; import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate; +import org.springframework.mock.env.MockEnvironment; import com.dsasp.server.common.workflow.service.ProcessCoreService; import com.eip4.platform.auth.security.AuthPrincipal; @@ -35,8 +37,18 @@ class TodoControllerAmisTest { private final StatusWriteback statusWriteback = mock(StatusWriteback.class); private final BusinessSummaryService businessSummaryService = mock(BusinessSummaryService.class); private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate = mock(JdbcTemplate.class); + // 共享控制器走旁路 profile(ci),其余 amis 端点测试不受 P0 脚本守卫影响。 private final TodoController controller = new TodoController( - aggregator, flowableClient, statusWriteback, businessSummaryService, jdbcTemplate); + aggregator, flowableClient, statusWriteback, businessSummaryService, jdbcTemplate, + new MockEnvironment().withProperty("spring.profiles.active", "ci")); + + /** 构造指定 active profile 的控制器(用于高级脚本端点的 profile 守卫测试)。 */ + private TodoController controllerWithProfiles(String... profiles) { + MockEnvironment env = new MockEnvironment(); + env.setActiveProfiles(profiles); + return new TodoController(aggregator, flowableClient, statusWriteback, + businessSummaryService, jdbcTemplate, env); + } private static AuthPrincipal principal() { return new AuthPrincipal("U1", "u1", "张三", "D1", "O1", List.of("R1")); @@ -302,4 +314,33 @@ class TodoControllerAmisTest { dto.ended = ended; return dto; } + + // ───────────────────── P0:高级处理脚本端点 profile 守卫(RCE 防护) ───────────────────── + + @Test + void advancedScript_严格profile_拒绝执行且不触达引擎() { + TodoController prod = controllerWithProfiles(); // 无 active profile = 严格(prod 同) + GatewayRequests.AdvancedScriptRequest req = new GatewayRequests.AdvancedScriptRequest(); + req.script = "Runtime.getRuntime().exec('id')"; // 攻击载荷 + + Map body = prod.runProcessAdvancedScript(principal(), "PI-1", req).getBody(); + + assertThat(body.get("status")).as("严格 profile 必须拒绝(amis status=1)").isEqualTo(1); + assertThat(String.valueOf(body.get("msg"))).contains("生产"); + // 关键:守卫在执行/取流程实例之前短路,脚本绝不进引擎 + verify(flowableClient, never()).processInstance(anyString()); + } + + @Test + void advancedScript_旁路profile_放行通过守卫到脚本校验() { + TodoController dev = controllerWithProfiles("dev"); + GatewayRequests.AdvancedScriptRequest req = new GatewayRequests.AdvancedScriptRequest(); + req.script = " "; // 空脚本:证明已越过 profile 守卫,落到下一道 script 非空校验 + + Map body = dev.runProcessAdvancedScript(principal(), "PI-1", req).getBody(); + + assertThat(body.get("status")).isEqualTo(1); + assertThat(String.valueOf(body.get("msg"))) + .as("旁路 profile 不被守卫拦截,落到脚本非空校验").contains("请输入高级处理脚本"); + } } From 1a0985ffa51f6953049b54c68f104650a2803ff6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhengwr Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:41:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] =?UTF-8?q?ci(P0=E2=91=A3):=20CI=20=E5=AD=A4=E5=84=BF?= =?UTF-8?q?=E8=BF=81=20Gitea=20Actions=20+=20JDK21=20+=20ci=20=E6=97=81?= =?UTF-8?q?=E8=B7=AF=20profile?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit .github/workflows/ci.yml(GHA 语法在 Gitea 上孤儿+JDK17 写死)迁至 .gitea/workflows/ci.yml(JDK21)。ci.sh 起服务加 --spring.profiles.active=ci(配合 P0① fail-safe,否则健康检查 401/对拍免令牌失效)。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- {.github => .gitea}/workflows/ci.yml | 13 ++++++++++--- scripts/ci.sh | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) rename {.github => .gitea}/workflows/ci.yml (56%) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml similarity index 56% rename from .github/workflows/ci.yml rename to .gitea/workflows/ci.yml index 91d8939..1da0def 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml @@ -1,4 +1,11 @@ -# eip4-platform CI:编译+单测+ArchUnit+对拍冒烟(公司自建 Git 服务可换 Jenkins,步骤同 scripts/ci.sh) +# eip4-platform CI(Gitea Actions)。 +# +# P0 修复(2026-06-24 架构评审):原 .github/workflows/ci.yml 在 Gitea(git.latent.chat)上是孤儿 +# (GitHub Actions 不会跑),且 java-version 写死 17(项目 JDK21)。本文件迁到 Gitea 规范位置 +# .gitea/workflows/,JDK 升 21。 +# +# 前置条件:Gitea 实例需已启用 Actions 且注册了带 `ubuntu-latest` 标签的 act_runner; +# 否则本工作流不会被调度(纯文件存在不等于会跑)。详见仓库 Actions 设置。 name: ci on: push: @@ -23,9 +30,9 @@ jobs: - uses: actions/setup-java@v4 with: distribution: temurin - java-version: "17" + java-version: "21" cache: maven - - name: 编译+单测+对拍冒烟 + - name: 编译+单测(含 ArchUnit)+对拍冒烟 env: CI_PG_HOST: localhost CI_PG_PORT: "5433" diff --git a/scripts/ci.sh b/scripts/ci.sh index 89cada5..6a555bf 100755 --- a/scripts/ci.sh +++ b/scripts/ci.sh @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ psql -h "$CI_PG_HOST" -p "$CI_PG_PORT" -U "$CI_PG_USER" -d "$CI_DB" -q \ JDBC="jdbc:postgresql://${CI_PG_HOST}:${CI_PG_PORT}/${CI_DB}" echo "==[3/4] 起服务(:${CI_PORT} → ${JDBC})==" +# profile=ci:对拍冒烟依赖免令牌 permitAll + asUser/roles 旁路(见 SecurityProfiles)。 +# P0 fail-safe 修复后默认严格链(无 profile=强制认证),故 CI 必须显式声明 ci profile, +# 否则健康检查 /api/entity/... 被拒 401、ParityCli 免令牌重放失效。 java -jar platform-app/target/platform-app-*.jar \ + --spring.profiles.active=ci \ --server.port="$CI_PORT" \ --spring.datasource.url="$JDBC" \ --spring.datasource.username="$CI_PG_USER" \